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Abstract  
The existence of a relative age effect (RAE) is well documented, i.e., those born 
early in the calendar year perform better at school and sports. We exploit a 
change in a selection period in youth football and regression discontinuity design 
in political selection to parliament in Finland to provide causal evidence of the 
RAE on long-run outcomes: The RAE is not driven by inherent advantages of an 
early year birth but rather by factors that favor those that are the oldest of a 
cohort irrespective of the calendar year. Thus, it is not limited to sports but has 
persistent consequences even on the selection to the highest positions of power 
within a society. Strikingly, we find strong evidence that the RAE only applies to 
males in competitive political environments.  
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1. Introduction 
 The relative age effect (RAE) refers to the possible advantage that children get when 
being relatively old in their cohort. The existence of an RAE in various professional sports 
and educational performance is well documented (see, e.g., Musch and Grondin, 2001, 
Bedard and Duhey, 2006, Böheim and Lackner, 2012, Fredriksson and Öckert, 2014, and 
Fumarco and Rossi, 2015). The academic and policy interest here arises for four primary 
reasons. First, there is a concern that artificial rules imposed by the society may create 
persistent inequality and, second, result in losing potential talent among the relatively young 
in many areas of human life. Third, the existence of an RAE should make a difference for 
decisions that parent take in family planning and raising children. For example, parents may 
be making uniformed decisions in enrolling their children to school earlier than obligatory or 
in waiving the possibility of seeking over-age permissions when warranted. Finally, 
understanding the mechanisms behind RAE offers a window into understanding early-life 
human capital accumulation.  
 Despite the extent of empirical analysis of the RAE, it has remained a possibility that 
the RAE could be driven by unobserved heterogeneity, for example, season of birth effects 
due to, e.g., biological, climatic, or environmental factors (Musch and Grondin, 2001). Nor it 
is clear to what extent the RAE exists beyond education and sports, and to what extent the 
RAE prevails in the long-run outcomes. Furthermore, the literature has largely focused on 
estimating the average RAE, paying much less attention to potential heterogeneity in the 
RAE. For example, it has been noted that there may be important gender differences in the 
prevalence of an RAE is team sports (e.g., Helsen et al., 2005, Vincent and Glamser, 2006, 
and Nakata and Sakamoto, 2012) but the evidence is somewhat inconclusive, and it is not 
clear whether such gender differences in the RAE exist in other areas of human life. Similarly, 
a competitive environment has been understood to be a key ingredient for the emergence of an 
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RAE in team sports (see, e.g., Musch and Grondin, 2001) but it is not clear whether this 
insight carries elsewhere. 
In this paper, we provide evidence of an RAE on long-run outcomes in politics and 
football (soccer), and that the RAE in neither politics nor in football is caused by unobserved 
heterogeneity, but rather by the factors that give a performance advantage to those of the 
oldest of a cohort. We also find strong evidence that the RAE only applies to males in 
competitive political environments, being absent from female politicians (and from young 
female football players) and, also absent in less competitive political environments, even in 
the case of males. In particular, we do not find evidence of the RAE among female politicians 
nor in local municipal elections where competition is much weaker that on the nation-wide 
parliamentary elections.  
 We provide comparative evidence from politics in Finland that corroborates Muller and 
Page’s (2015) seminal findings of the existence of an RAE in the US politics. Going beyond 
Muller and Page (2015), we find that gender and the intensity of electoral competition matters 
for the emergence of an RAE in political selection. Our results suggest that those males who 
have benefited from RAE during early-life in school seem to perform better, and thus, 
political selection in Finland is at least to some extent meritocratic. Therefore, we contribute 
to understanding political selection (see, e.g., Caselli and Moreno, 2004, and Poutvaara and 
Takalo, 2007, for theoretical foundations, and Galasso and Nannicini, 2011, Kotakorpi and 
Poutvaara, 2011, Folke et al., 2016, and Dal Bo et al. 2017 among others for empirical 
evidence). On the other, the result has a less positive implication: We seem to be losing 
potential talent among the late born in the political arena due to artificial rules imposed by the 
society on the school starting age. 
Our leading evidence comes from the Finnish politicians, which provides a useful 
environment to study gender-specific relative age effects. Finland was the first country in 
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Europe to introduce women’s suffrage in 1907 and female representation in politics has been 
since then high by international standards. For example, in 2015 parliamentary elections, 
roughly 40% of candidates and successfully elected candidates were female. We use 
regression discontinuity design (RDD) to show that the RAE is driven by those that are born 
close to the beginning of a calendar year. More specifically, the closer is the exact date of the 
birth of a January-born candidate to the New Year, the larger is his probability to become 
elected in parliamentary elections. As briefly reviewed in the next section, the literature on the 
RAE in sports and education is large and spreading across many fields of science. But, to the 
best of our knowledge, there are no previous studies that would consider how the RAE in 
politics varies with gender and competitive environment.  
We augment our conclusions by the evidence from the Finnish football players. There 
we can exploit an age-limit change in 1987 that shifted the admission year threshold by four 
months. We show how football players born in the early of an admission year are 
overrepresented in the professional adult football league, irrespective of the calendar year. 
The shift in the admission date resulted in a drop in the representation of those that are born 
early in the previous admission regime and corresponding increase in the representation of 
those that are born early in a calendar year under the new, calendar year-based admission 
regime. While our analysis of the Finnish football focuses on causal inference using data on 
male players, we also provide some tentative evidence of the gender differences in the RAE in 
the Finnish football that support our results from the Finnish politicians. 
Our findings shed some light on the mechanisms underlying the emergence of the 
RAE. In particular, the heterogeneity in the RAE with respect to gender and intensity of 
competition supports psychological and biological theories as the main mechanism, but fits 
less well with the resource-based theories of the RAE. As a result, the findings help to design 
appropriate policy response to the RAE.   
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In the next section we survey the previous literature documenting the existence of the 
RAE and various theories proposed to explain this phenomenon. We describe our data and 
institutional background in Section 3. The empirical strategy and estimation results for 
football players are presented in Section 4. Then, in Section 5, we proceed to the main 
contribution of our paper, to our empirical investigation of the RAE among the Finnish 
politicians. We conclude in Section 6. 
 
2. Previous Literature 
2.1 Evidence of the RAE  
There is a large, multidisciplinary literature documenting the existence of an RAE in 
educational performance and professional sports. There is also some evidence that the effect 
is causal and not driven by season of birth effects. For example, there is cross-country 
variation in the school and youth sport admission cut-off dates which has been exploited in 
identification (e.g., Munch and Hay, 1999, and Bedard and Duhey, 2006). While this evidence 
is quite convincing, there is still possibility that the cut-off date and relative performance 
variation may be partially driven by the same factors. For example, climatic factors partially 
explain school and sport season and cut-off variation around the world (e.g., for historical 
reasons school entry takes place after the harvesting period, i.e., in August-October in the 
Northern Hemisphere, and in March-May in the Southern Hemisphere, and this is reflected in 
the school cut-off dates) and it could still be possible that similar climatic factors (e.g. 
exposure to sun light at a critical development stage) contribute to the relative performance 
gap.  
 Another straightforward way to provide causal evidence is to exploit variation over 
time in the cut-off dates. For example, since 1980s there has been international effort to 
harmonize cut-off dates for youth football to the 1st of January. Munch and Hay (1999) and 
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Helsen et al. (2000) exploit this shift in Australian and Belgian youth soccer cut-off dates, 
respectively, and show that performance advantage of those born early in the previous regime 
vanishes in the new regime whereas those born early in the new regime gain a performance 
advantage. In this paper we exploit the same shift in the admission date in the Finnish football 
that occurred in 1987 in Finland.  
 A third way to provide causal evidence on the existence of the RAE is resort to RDD. 
For example, Barnsley and Thompson (1988), Ponzo and Scoppa (2014) and Crawford et al. 
(2014) provide evidence for the existence of a performance gap between those born one 
month before and one after the cut-off date in ice-hockey and education. For politics, we 
perform a RDD where use data around the cut-off date. Unlike the above studies, we optimize 
our estimation window instead of resorting to arbitrary windows and use state-of-the-art 
inference (Calonico et al., 2014, and 2016a).  
The existence of gender differences in the RAE in sports, especially in football, are 
also extensively studied. Overall, the presence of the RAE in female football appears to be 
smaller than in male football, but the evidence is somewhat inconclusive (see, e.g., Helsen et 
al. 2005, Vincent and Glamser, 2006, Nakata and Samamoto, 2012, and Kirkendal, 2014)1 As 
the female football is relatively popular and high quality in Finland2, we are able to make an 
preliminary investigation to the gender differences in the existence of the RAE in the Finnish 
football.  
                                                 
1 Evidence of the existence of the RAE from the studies focusing on female football players (rather than on 
gender differences) is also somewhat ambiguous (see, e.g., Delorme et al. 2010, and .Romann and Fuchslocher, 
2011), suggesting potential gender differences. 
2 For example, the share of registered female players to all football players was above 20% in 2013. In contrast 
to the Finland men’s national team, the women’s national team has qualified several times in the European 
Championship and World Cup final tournaments.  
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Beyond sports and education, there is relative paucity of studies of the RAE that allow 
for a causal interpretation and the study of gender differences in other areas of human life. 
Muller and Page (2015) document the evidence for the existence of a bias in the birth rates for 
US congress representatives, favoring those where the eldest in their cohort at school. We 
complement their study by using RDD to estimate the effects of the RAE in the Finnish 
parliament and municipal elections.  Because female candidates are relatively prevalent in 
Finland, we also can study the gender differences in the existence of the RAE in politics. 
Fredrikson and Öckert (2014) and Landersøn et al. (2016) use the RDD approach to 
study the effect of school starting age on long-run labor market outcomes and youth crime, 
respectively. They also consider gender differences. Landersø et al. (2016) find that higher 
relative school starting age reduces the probability of committing a crime at a young age and 
that the effect is significantly stronger for boys than girls. Fredrikson and Öckert (2014) find 
little positive long-run effects on labor market outcomes except in case of women’s prime age 
employment.3  
 
                                                 
3 Fredrikson and Öckert (2014) find a stronger gender gap in favor of girls when they study the effect of school 
starting age on educational attainment. However, Fredrikson and Öckert (2014) also show that boys born just 
before (after) the school entry cut-off are more likely to start their school late (early) than girls, which makes the 
true relative school starting age much smaller for boys than girls around the cut-off.    
 7
2.2 Theories for the Emergence of the RAE 
There are various explanations for the emergence of the RAE. First, it has been noted 
that the RAE is more prevalent in more competitive environments in sports (see, e.g., Musch 
and Grondin, 2001). The more popular is the sport in a country or a region, the more intense 
the competition for the elite teams or national teams and the stronger is the RAE. We provide 
evidence that competition is also conducive for the emergence of an RAE in politics.  
The arguments for why relative age matters can be loosely grouped in two categories. 
First, there is an argument that the RAE emerges because the more advanced in a cohort get 
more resources in their youth than the less advanced. For example, more advanced students 
and football players may get more attention and advice from teachers and coaches. In schools, 
they may be allocated more responsibilities, e.g., they may act as auxiliary teachers or 
represent the class in various school committees. In football, they may get more easily 
selected in elite teams where coaches and other training facilities are better or they may get 
more playing time in more important positions (e.g., central midfield) which are more 
conducive for future development. This discrimination then amplifies the initial ability 
differences that may have been entirely due to relative age, rendering the differences 
persistent.   
Another class of explanations for the emergence of the RAE is based on psychology 
and human biology (see, e.g., Musch and Grondin, 2001). For example, being better than 
peers strengthen children’s self-esteem, self-confidence, and locus of control (i.e., belief in the 
ability to control own destiny) per se.  Encouragement and attention by teachers and coaches 
strengthen further these attributes. Similarly, additional responsibilities in school and playing 
in more important positions in football (and being e.g. a captain of the team) should also boost 
self-esteem, self-confidence, and locus of control. This should affect positively motivation 
and determination to perform well, yielding those children further success. Importantly, this 
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amplification mechanism works in the reverse direction, too, i.e., performing weaker than 
peers dilutes self-confidence, self-esteem, locus of control, diluting motivation and 
determination, and so on. As a result, small differences in ability due to relative age are 
amplified over time to large, persistent differences in performance and outcomes.  
It is likely that both mechanisms are relevant for the emergence of the RAE, but it 
would be useful to know whether one of them is more important than the other. It is however 
empirically very challenging to tell apart the effects of the theories because the emergence 
from the same sources. Our contribution to this literature is that differences in the existence of 
the RAE in terms of gender and competitive environment should provide at least some 
speculative evidence about the underlying mechanism.  
 
3. Data and Institutional Background 
3.1 The Finnish Education System  
Since experiences at school are the main mechanism in explaining the existence of 
RAE in politics, we review the Finnish education system here briefly. The compulsory basic 
education in Finland consists of nine years of comprehensive school, which begins during the 
calendar year a child turns seven.  
There are no tuition fees at any stage of education and, in addition, in comprehensive 
school all the materials, transportation and lunch are free as well. Virtually all children in 
Finland complete basic education. For instance, according to the Finnish National Board of 
Education, only 0.1% of a cohort do not graduate from comprehensive school. At the end of 
ninth grade, each student who has passed all subjects receives a basic education certificate, 
which contains a numerical or verbal assessment in each subject. The certificate is used the 
main criteria in the selection process to the upper secondary schools where, according to the 
Finnish National Board of Education, roughly 90% of students continue after completing the 
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compulsory basic education. Anyone who has completed an upper secondary school is 
eligible to apply to a university. Depending on the subject and university, students are chosen 
through an entrance exam and based on their matriculation examination.  
A few features make the Finnish education system conducive for the emergence of the 
RAE in other areas of human life. First, because of the schools starting rule, at the beginning 
of the first grade of the basic education, the oldest of a cohort can be almost one year older 
than the youngest of the cohort. Second, retention during basic education is uncommon. For 
instance, according to the Finnish National Board of Education, only 0.5 % of students were 
held back in comprehensive school annually during the years 2000-2007. This should 
guarantee that most adults have spent the same number of years in comprehensive school. 
Third, postponing school start or earlier enrollments to school are relatively rare. Only around 
2% percent of students in each cohort have delayed the start of school between the years 
1995-1999 (Kaila, 2017). Fourth, compulsory education extends to a relatively old age in 
Finland, so the initial large differences in the relative age have time to accumulate. Finally, 
according to the Finnish National Institute for Health and Welfare, almost all babies (99.6%) 
in Finland are born in hospitals where their date of birth is carefully documented.  
 
3.2 Football Players 
Roughly corresponding to, for example, the English Premier League and Women’s 
Super League, Veikkausliiga, the Finnish Football League, (the league is named according to 
its main sponsor, Veikkaus, the Finnish National Betting Agency) and Naisten Liiga 
(“Women’s League”) were established in 1990 and 2006 to take care of the highest level of 
men’s and women’s football, respectively. Before establishment of these separate 
organizations taking care of the highest level football competition, the top leagues were called 
Mestaruussarja (“Championship series”). Ykkönen (“Division one”) and Kakkonen (“Division 
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two”) are the second and third highest level of the Finnish football for both males and 
females. Kakkonen is spit to three different groups so there are more teams in Kakkonen than 
in the two highest leagues together.  
Football in the three highest leagues are considered to be competitive and at least 
semi-professional. Veikkausliiga is operated by an independent organization, the Finnish 
Football League Association. Naisten Liiga, Ykkönen and Kakkonen are operated under the 
Football Association of Finland, whereas lower leagues are organized locally. Only in 
Veikkausliiga, most players are full professionals (albeit the average earning is low by the 
European standards). In Naisten Liiga, Ykkönen and Kakkonen, as well as in the 
Mestaruussarja in the past, most players are semi-professionals. Because the earning potential 
even in Veikkausliiga is low, the very top Finnish players seek entry to the main professional 
leagues abroad.  
 The organization of the youth football is the roughly similar for boys and girls. There 
are thousands of teams that compete against each other in regional competitions and various 
cups. The best players are selected to youth national teams, starting from age 14 for boys and 
slightly later for girls.  
We manually collected data of the players of Veikkausliiga from the start of the league 
in 1990 until 2014 from the webpages of the Finnish Football League Association.4 Excluding 
foreign players and counting each player playing multiple seasons only once, this resulted in 
1463 players who have appeared in Veikkausliiga at least in one season.  
To make a tentative investigation of the gender differences in the Finnish football, we 
also collected data for players who appeared in Nasten liiga, Ykkönen and Kakkonen (both 
for women and men) in the year 2013 from Jalkapallokirja 2013 (Soininen, 2013), which is 
an annual statistical yearbook of the Football Association of Finland. This was augmented by 
                                                 
4 http://www.veikkausliiga.com/veikkausliiga/veikkausliigan-tilastohistoria, last accessed June 8, 2017.  
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collecting data on players who appeared in youth national teams in the spring of 2013 (for 
boys) and the spring of 2014 (for girls) from the webpages of the Football Association of 
Finland.5 This resulted in additional 1631 adult player observations (550 women and 1081 
men) and 262 youth player observations (122 girls and 140 boys).   
 
3.3 Politicians 
We have data from two types of general elections for the representatives for the 
Finnish democratic institutions.6 Municipal elections are held to elect the municipal 
councilors. Although the number of municipalities has significantly reduced over the recent 
decades, at the beginning of 2016 there were still 313 municipalities in Finland and the 
median size was only roughly 6000 inhabitants. The larger the municipality the larger the 
number of councilors elected. Voters of a municipal election consist of adult European Union 
citizens whose home address is in the municipality.  Being a councilor of a municipality is not 
a paid job but the councilors only get small honorariums.  
 In the nation-wide parliamentary elections, the 200 members of the Finnish 
parliament are selected by the proportional D’Hondt method. The electorate consists of 
roughly 4.5 million adult Finnish citizens, divided into 13 electoral districts. Being a member 
of the parliament is a full-time job with a relatively high salary.  
                                                 
5 Data for boys was retrieved from https://www.palloliitto.fi/maajoukkueet/pojat in June, 2013 for all national 
youth teams from the youngest, under-15 years old (U15) team to the oldest, U20 team. Data for girls was 
retrieved from https://www.palloliitto.fi/maajoukkueet/tytot in June 2014, for U17-U20 teams (player data for 
girls’ U15 and U16 teams was not displayed because youth national teams for girls typically start competitive 
games slightly later than boys).   
6 Besides these two elections the Finns participate for the elections for members of the European parliament and 
the election for the President of the Finland.  
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Female representation both at the candidate and elected official level is high by the 
international standards although the majority of candidates and elected officials are males.   
Both municipal and parliamentary elections are held every four years, but not on the same 
year. Both elections use the open list proportional representation system, where voters have to 
place a preference vote for an individual candidate. This system creates incentives to cultivate 
a personal vote and induces competition both within and between parties (Carey and Shugart 
1995) making it a plausible case for the RAE to arise. 
We have access to a candidate level election data for 1996-2012 municipal elections 
and 1999-2007 parliamentary elections. These data are from the Finnish Ministry of Justice. 
We describe these data in Table 1. There is a similar quite high about 40% share of female 
candidates in both types of elections. Also the age distribution of candidates is fairly similar 
in both elections. The parliamentary elections seem to be much more competitive in terms of 
the number of candidates, the number of votes and especially the much lower share of elected, 
even conditional on the smaller set of candidates. 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics on candidates. 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Municipal elections 
Votes 198,120 61 149 0 11815 
Elected 198,121 0.286 0.452 0 1 
Female 198,121 0.387 0.487 0 1 
Age 198,120 46.7 12.6 18 95 
Parliamentary elections 
Votes 6,026 1368 2386 3 60563 
Elected 6,026 0.100 0.299 0 1 
Female 6,026 0.389 0.488 0 1 
Age 6,026 46.1 12.8 18 87 
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4. Empirical Strategy and Results: Football Players 
As an introduction to our study of the emergence of the RAE among the Finnish 
politicians, we present evidence of the RAE among the Finnish football players. The purpose 
of this section is twofold. First, since the literature on the RAE in football is large, we can 
compare whether the RAE in football in Finland is similar to the one prevailing in other 
countries or not. If it is, we are more confident that our new results concerning politicians are 
not caused by some characteristic unique to Finland. Second, in the case of football, we can 
use the reform concerning the age group cut-off date to study the causal effect of relative age: 
Before 1987, the cut-off date was the 1st of August but from 1987 onwards, the cut-off date 
has been the 1st of January.  
While the reform would facilitate difference-in-differences -style regressions, its effect 
is easiest and most transparent to observe from simple descriptive monthly counts. We do not 
report the actual regressions but it suffices to say that discussed effects are also statistically 
significant at standard levels. To take into account the change in the cut-off date, we split our 
sample of football players into three groups according to the birth-year of a player, as shown 
in Table 2. The first group consists of those born in 1972 or earlier. We assume that those 
players were old enough in 1987 that the change in the cut-off had no impact on their 
performance.7  Similarly, we assume that those born in 1982 and after were young enough 
that the change in the cut-off had no impact on their performance. Those players, constituting 
group 3, were 5 years old or younger in 1987.8  Finally, our second group of players 
comprises of those who are born between 1973-1981. They were exposed to both regimes in 
                                                 
7 For example, among the youngest players in this group is the former Ajax, Barcelona, and Liverpool player Jari 
Litmanen, who is born 20 February 1971. We assume that he was old enough in 1987 so that the fact that he 
suddenly became among the oldest players of his cohort did not contribute to his rise to global fame.   
8 For example, virtually all currently active players belong to this group.  
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their youth over several years and, as a result, received offsetting experience of their relative 
average.9  
In sum, we expect that in the old selection regime (group 1), players born in autumn 
and summer are over- and underrepresented, respectively, in youth national teams.10 Were the 
RAE to have long-run effects, the same over- and underrepresentation should also show up in 
Veikkausliiga. If the RAE has a causal interpretation, this over and under representation 
should vanish in the new selection regime (group 3) where players born at the beginning and 
the end of the year should in turn be over- and underrepresented respectively. In contrast, 
among group 2 players, who were exposed to both regimes, the RAE might be present at both 
cut-offs, if at all.  
In Table 2, we report the calendar month counts of the players that played in 
Veikkausliiga at least for one season between years 1990-2014. As explained in Section 3.2, 
players that played for many seasons are counted only once, and foreign players are excluded, 
which results in 1463 players. Table 2 is divided into three columns based on the above 
explanation how the reform affected them. We have 390, 435 and 638 players in group 
(column) 1, 2 and 3, respectively. The horizontal lines represent the age group cut-offs.  
Table 2 presents strong evidence of an RAE as months below (above) cut-offs are 
overrepresented (underrepresented). Importantly, this holds despite the actual cut-off 
changing with respect to the calendar year ruling out seasonal effects. In the middle column 
there appears to be a jump at both the cut-offs. 
  
                                                 
9 For example, one of the older players in this group is the former Liverpool and Bayer Leverkusen defender 
Sami Hyypiä who is born 7 October 1973. He was 13 years old when he suddenly changed of being one of the 
oldest of his cohort to being one of the youngest. We assume that players like him were under the influence of 
both regimes for enough many years so that their relative age effects are ”contaminated”. 
10 Unless otherwise stated, seasons of the year refer to the ones prevailing in the Northern Hemishpere. 
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Table 2. Male Veikkausliiga players, seasons 1990-2014, counts. 
Born <73 73-81 Born >81 
Month Before During After 
1 29 42 61 
2 24 35 61 
3 44 45 80 
4 34 44 69 
5 21 35 60 
6 29 33 59 
7 25 26 49 
8 38 53 42 
9 39 37 46 
10 30 21 39 
11 35 36 36 
12 42 28 36 
Total 390 435 638 
 
There is clear seasonal variation in the birth rates in Finland. For example, March is 
most common birth month due to the so-called midsummer babies. This may bias the counts, 
for example, those born in March are over-represented in all three regimes according to Table 
2. Therefore, we present the results controlling for the monthly variation in birth rates in 
Table 3. The pattern documented in Table 2 continues to exist (curiously, also the 
overrepresentation of March in all regimes continues to exists).  
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Table 3. Male Veikkausliiga players, seasons 1990-2014, relative to births in the entire 
Finnish population, shares. 
Born <73 73-81 Born >81 
Month Before During After 
1 -0.009 0.014 0.016 
2 -0.004 0.001 0.026 
3 0.021 0.011 0.036 
4 0.006 0.012 0.028 
5 -0.028 -0.008 0.012 
6 -0.010 -0.010 0.008 
7 -0.008 -0.027 0.000 
8 0.024 0.041 -0.004 
9 0.035 0.005 -0.002 
10 0.005 -0.031 -0.016 
11 0.016 0.007 -0.008 
12 0.035 -0.014 -0.007 
 
In Table 4, we report results concerning the gender differences in the Finnish football. 
As mentioned in Section 3.2, we have comparable data for both genders only for year 2013. 
This has the advantage that there are no longer any pre-reform players (those born 1972 or 
earlier) in our data of adult players and none of the youth national team players in our data 
have experience of the old system (the oldest of them were three years at the regime shift).  
In the two left hand columns of Table 4, we report the results for the three highest 
leagues for both adult men and women. In the two right hand columns, we use data for boys’ 
and girls’ youth national teams. We report shares of the month within the column and the total 
count. For example, for boys this implies that in there are 22 players (122*0.1803) born in 
January and only 2 in December that have been representing Finland in a youth national team.  
There are two main lessons. First, the RAE is fairly similar for adult male and female 
players and present for both. Note, however, that our data here does not separate group 2 
(born 1973-1981) and group 3 (born 1982 or later) players. This should bias both the RAE 
and observed gender differences downwards, since male players are on average older than 
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female players and, as a result, there are more men who started to play football under the old 
cut-off system. Second, the RAE is by far the largest for boys and almost absent for girls. This 
quite striking difference should, however, interpreted cautiously due to fairly low number of 
observations of youth players, even given that the difference is significant statistically.  
 
Table 4. Gender differences in football, shares, no pre-reform players. 
3 highest leagues Youth national teams 
Month Men Women Boys Girls 
1 10.27 11.09 18.03 7.86 
2 7.68 8.36 18.85 10.71 
3 11.47 8 11.48 12.14 
4 9.9 11.09 15.57 12.86 
5 8.88 10.18 9.84 6.43 
6 8.88 6.36 4.92 14.29 
7 6.94 7.27 3.28 7.86 
8 6.94 10.36 4.92 4.29 
9 8.6 8 4.92 7.14 
10 7.22 7.27 4.1 8.57 
11 6.75 5.45 2.46 2.86 
12 6.48 6.55 1.64 5 
Count 1081 550 122 140 
 
Overall, the RAE in football in Finland is similar to the one prevailing in other 
countries, suggesting that our new results concerning the RAE among politicians presented in 
the next section might also generalize to other countries with similar school system and 
political institutions. 
  
5. Empirical Strategy and Results: Politicians 
5.1 Identification Strategy and Implementation 
To evaluate whether or not RAE exist in politics and whether or not the effect has a causal 
interpretation, we employ RDD. We compare the electoral performance of candidates that are 
of the same absolute age, and born in the same season, but were of different relative age 
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among their cohort, e.g., when in school and in other children and youth activities using the 
1st of January cut-off date. More specifically, we ask whether a candidate born on the 1st 
January of any given year has a higher probability to get elected (and to run for office) than a 
candidate born on the 31st of December of the previous year. These candidates have a 1 day 
absolute age difference but a 1 year relative age difference. Moreover, we study whether the 
the effect on the success probability of a January-born candidate becomes smaller the later he 
or she is born in a calendar year. We evaluate the different types of elections (municipal, 
parliamentary) separately, and also conduct the gender analysis using separate samples. 
In RDD, we compare two candidates with different relative age but the same absolute 
age and same season of birth.  We estimate regression functions of the form 
 
(1) Yit = α + β•1{vit> 0} + f(vit) + εit, 
 
where Yit is the outcome of interest, in particular, whether the candidate gets elected. The 
forcing variable vit measures the distance from the cut-off located at the turn of the calendar 
year. To make the forcing variable equidistant on both sides of the cut-off, January 1 and 
December 31 get values of 0.5 and -0.5, respectively, and the other dates are assigned values 
accordingly. We also account for leap years.  
In the right hand side of equation (1), 1{vit > 0} is an indicator function for being 
relatively old (born on the right side of the cut-off), and β is the coefficient of interest. If f(vit) 
is approximately correctly specified within a bandwidth, and there is no precise manipulation 
of the forcing variable (i.e., the density is smooth at the threshold), the other covariates should 
evolve smoothly at the boundary, and thus, β will be the causal estimate of the primary effect. 
In this context, it is very likely that the treatment assignment is as-good-as-random close to 
the threshold, because parents cannot perfectly control the exact date of when giving their 
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birth. As is standard in RDD, imprecise manipulation of the birth date does not hinder 
identification. For example, even if some selected parents would aim to give birth early in the 
year, we would be able to identify the causal effect of interest.  
As advised in recent work (e.g. Gelman and Imbens 2014), we will execute the design 
using low-order local polynomial specifications. Our implementation follows closely recent 
suggestions of Calonico et al. (2014 and 2016a). We employ the Mean Squared Error (MSE) 
optimal bandwidths provided by Calonico et al. (2016b) that improve on the existing MSE-
optimal bandwidths by Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) (columns (1)-(4) in Tables 5-8) and 
Calonico et al. (2014), and also their Coverage Error Rate (CER) optimal bandwidths (column 
(5) in Tables 5-8). We also verify the robustness to alternative range of bandwidths (columns 
(1)-(2) in Tables 5-8 and Figure 6). We conduct the RDD both with (somewhat outdated, see 
Hyytinen et al. 2016, Calonico et al. 2014 and 2016a) conventional local linear approach 
(columns (1)-(2) in Tables 5-8), but also with the more recent approach of bias correction and 
robust inference suggested by Calonico et al. (2014 and 2016a) (columns (3)-(5) in Tables 5-
8, referred to as the CCT-correction). We also report results where we fix the main and bias 
bandwidths to be the same following the advice in Calonico et al. (2016a) and Hyytinen et al. 
(2016) (column (4) in Tables 5-8). All local regressions use the standard triangular kernel. We 
use local linear specification in the conventional approach, and in the CCT-correction we use 
local linear for the main effect estimation and local quadratic for the bias estimation. 
Again following this recent literature, we report in Tables 5-8 the conventional local 
linear MSE-optimal coefficient (because that is optimal choice for the point estimate), but for 
statistical inference, we report confidence intervals based on the bias-corrected coefficient and 
associated robust inference by Calonico et al. (2014) due to its superior coverage properties. 
This implies that 95% confidence intervals are not centered around the reported MSE-optimal 
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coefficients in the bias-corrected columns, but rather around the (non-reported) bias-corrected 
estimate. 
Typically this design would identify an average treatment effect (ATE) at the 
thresholds. This local effect happens to be precisely the RAE of interest for us in the sense of 
relating to maximum relative age difference possible in this institution. One caveat is that if 
there is selection that children have been pushed to school earlier or later than their calendar 
year would indicate, we are identifying an intent-to-treat effect (ITT). An ITT is likely to be a 
lower bound of ATE in this case due to contamination. However, it is very rare in Finland not 
to follow the calendar year assignment to school cohorts, and thus, in our case ITT is likely to 
be very close to ATE.  Dee and Sievertsen (2015) show using real school starting age data 
from Denmark that the ITT and ATE are in practice identical. 
 
5.2 RDD Results 
In Figures 1a-b) we show the results graphically for the parliamentary elections for all 
candidates.11 Figure 1a is a global regression using all the data and 4th order polynomial 
specification (as is default in the rdplot STATA package), and figure 1b is the local linear 
specification within the MSE-optimal bandwidth. The vertical axis shows the success 
probability and the horizontal axis describes the distance to the New Year cut-off (the 0-point) 
in days. It is evident from the figures that those born early in the year have a higher success 
probability in elections. In other words, the RAE appears to exist in politics.  
 
                                                 
11 Figures are plotted with the rdplot command in STATA by Calonico et al. (2015). For the bin sizes, we use the 
option that mimics variance of the data rather the one that mimics the regression fit of the data. 
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Table 5 displays the regression results. The coefficient for relative age is positive and 
statistically significant in all the reported regressions. Both the regression results and 
graphical results clearly document the existence of the RAE, and suggest a causal 
interpretation. The effect is also very large: The MSE-optimal estimate implies that being 
born in January 1st instead of December 31st increase the probability of getting elected to the 
parliament by 8.3 percentage points (conditional on running for the parliament). This almost 
doubles the baseline probability given that in the data, 600 candidates are elected (200 per 
elections) and we have a total of 6026 candidate-election observations.   
 
Table 5. RAE for parliamentary election candidates. 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Estimate  0.172***  0.083**  0.083**  0.083***  0.158*** 
95% CI  [0.055;0.289]  [0.003;0.164]  [0.012;0.188]  [0.061;0.269]  [0.067;0.307] 
Method  Convent. local lin.  Convent. local lin. CCT‐correction  CCT‐correction  CCT‐correction 
Bandwidth selector  MSE*0.5  MSE  MSE  MSE  CER 
Bandwidth(s)  17  36  36/70  36/36  23/70 
Effective N  629  1192  1192  1192  786 
 
Next, we turn to gender specific effects. We run the RDD separately on the samples of 
male or female candidates. The results for the males are presented in Figures 2a and 2b and 
Table 6 and for females in Figures 3a and 3b and Table 3. The results are striking: We find 
robust, very large and statistically significant effects for males and robust non-significant 
negative coefficients for females. Importantly, the results for males are also statistically 
significantly different from the female results (so not only from zero). These results provide 
strong evidence that of the existence of an RAE in the case of male politicians but no RAE in 
the case of female politicians.  
  
 
Figu
Figure 2
re 2a. RAE
b. RAE fo
 for male p
r male parli
23
arliamentar
 
 
amentary e
y election c
lection can
andidates, 
didates, loc
global RDD
al RDD. 
. 
 
 
  
Est
95
Me
Ba
Ba
N 
 
imate 
% CI 
thod 
ndwidth sele
ndwidth(s) 
 
 
 
0
[0.1
Conv
ctor  M
Figure 3a
Table 6
(1) 
.295*** 
50;0.439] 
ent. local lin
SE*0.5 
15 
305 
. RAE for 
. RAE for m
(2
0.181
[0.060;0
.  Convent. 
MS
30
62
female parl
24
ale parliam
) 
*** 
.303]  [
local lin. C
E 
 
1 
 
iamentary e
entary elec
(3) 
0.181***
0.090;0.319
CT‐correctio
MSE 
30/62 
621 
lection can
tion candid
(
0.18
]  [0.164
n  CCT‐co
M
30
6
didates, glo
ates. 
4) 
1*** 
;0.464] 
rrection  C
SE 
/30 
21 
bal RDD. 
(5) 
0.256***
[0.136;0.396
CT‐correctio
CER 
20/62 
410 
 
] 
n 
  
Est
95
Me
Ba
Ba
N 
 
 
 
imate 
% CI 
thod 
ndwidth sele
ndwidth(s) 
 
T
analysis
confiden
parliam
the who
that the 
Figure 3
[‐0.
Conv
ctor  M
o understa
 for males
ce interval
entary elect
le sample i
RAE may 
b. RAE for
Table 7. 
(1) 
‐0.013 
135;0.109] 
ent. local lin
SE*0.5 
33 
442 
nd whethe
 in local el
s are quite 
ions. We r
ndicate qu
be more nu
 female par
RAE for fe
(2
‐0.0
[‐0.126;
.  Convent. 
MS
67
84
r RAE dep
ections. W
narrow, at 
eport only 
ite precisely
anced that 
25
liamentary 
male parlia
) 
38 
0.049]  [
local lin. C
E 
 
5 
 
ends on th
e find no 
least relativ
the results 
 estimated
what is co
election can
mentary ele
(3) 
‐0.038 
‐0.132;0.063
CT‐correctio
MSE 
67/101 
845 
e extent on
evidence o
e to the eff
for males b
 zero effec
mmonly tho
didates, lo
ction candi
(
‐0.
]  [‐0.148
n  CCT‐co
M
67
8
 competitio
f an RAE 
ect magnitu
ut also the 
t. The resul
ught: We 
cal RDD.
dates. 
4) 
038 
;0.089] 
rrection  C
SE 
/67 
45 
n, we repe
in that sam
de for the 
female sam
ts in Table
find eviden
 
(5) 
‐0.041 
[‐0.145;0.06
CT‐correctio
CER 
45/101 
575 
ated the 
ple and 
males in 
ple and 
 8 show 
ce of an 
7] 
n 
 RAE in
otherwi
 
 
Figure 
 
 case of 
se.    
Figure 4
4b. RAE fo
males com
a. RAE fo
r male mun
peting for 
r male mun
icipality el
26
top politic
icipality ele
ection cand
al position
ction cand
idates, loca
s, but we
idates, glob
l RDD. 
 find no e
al RDD. 
vidence 
 
 
 27
Table 8. RAE for male municipality election candidates. 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Estimate  0.00274  ‐0.00589  ‐0.00589  ‐0.00589  ‐0.0027 
95% CI  [‐0.0475;0.0529]  [‐0.0400;0.0282]  [‐0.0355;0.0199] [‐0.0383;0.0305]  [‐0.0362;0.0296]
Method  Convent. local lin.  Convent. local lin. CCT‐correction  CCT‐correction  CCT‐correction 
Bandwidth selector  MSE*0.5  MSE  MSE  MSE  CER 
Bandwidth(s)  24  47  47/73  47/47  26/73 
N  15126  29479  29479  29479  16360 
  
5.3 RDD Robustness and Validity Tests 
For the sake of brevity, we report the robustness and validity checks only for the sample 
of males in parliamentary elections, because that is the only sample where we claim to have 
found a positive effect. We begin with the analysis of running for candidacy. Here we do not 
observe the set of all potential candidates, but only the actual candidates. Thus, we conduct 
McCrary (2008) density estimation. Note that the object here is not to seek for manipulation 
that would invalidate the design, but rather to estimate a real effect if interest, that is, the RAE 
on becoming a candidate in parliamentary elections. The results are presented in Figure 5. The 
coefficient of the jump is not statistically significant meaning that there is no evidence of such 
an effect.  
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sports are not driven solely by the different role of physical requirements in male and female 
sports as speculated in the literature.  
Rather, we think that gender differences in the RAE could arise from gender differences 
in preferences for and responses to competition. Famously, Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) 
and the subsequent literature shows that women shy away from competition whereas men 
embrace it. Moreover, men typically perform better in competitive environments. Finally, the 
adverse effects of performing badly in competitive environments seem to be larger for men 
than women. For example, Eliason and Storre (2009) report large negative health effects for 
men due to job loss but these effects are absent for women. In light of this literature, our 
results provide suggestive evidence that the RAE is driven by the human capital accumulation 
resulting from in particular the males benefiting from being able to successfully compete with 
their peers from early on in life.    
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